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A Double-Edged Sword: Communications and 
Imperial Control in British India 
Daniel Headrick ∗ 
Abstract: »Ein zweischneidiges Schwert: Telekommunikation und imperiale 
Kontrolle in Britisch-Indien«. Britain introduced telegraphs in its colonial em-
pires in order to tighten its control over its subjects. Thus, the British in India 
used their new telegraph lines to repress the Indian Mutiny of 1857 and has-
tened thereafter to lay cables from England to India and around Africa. Imperi-
alists extolled the advent of telegraphy as establishing permanent ties to their 
colonies, often comparing these ties to the Roman roads and postal system. 
Telecommunications had another effect, however, namely it spread the news 
from distant places, thereby undermining the colonial status quo. News of the 
Japanese victory over Russia in 1905 had a galvanizing effect on the nationalist 
movement in India and the Swadeshi agitation in Bengal. Later, news of the 
activities of Gandhi and his followers brought Indians from different regions 
together in a way that could not have happened in the mid-nineteenth century. 
Thus the hopes that the imperialists placed in the controlling powers of tele-
communication proved to be misplaced. 
Keywords: Communications, telegraph, East India Company, Dalhousie, In-
dian Rebellion, steamships, P&O, submarine telegraph cables, Eastern Tele-
graph Company, news agencies, Reuters, Curzon, Swadeshi, Russo-Japanese 
War, Gandhi, Nehru, globalization, nationalism, fragmentation. 
 
Technological change produces unexpected consequences. Nowhere is this 
clearer than in the case of communication. Throughout history, governments 
have invested enormous sums in communication networks designed to bind 
their far-flung outposts into cohesive empires. Even the earliest empires con-
sidered efficient communications essential to their survival. King Darius of 
Persia built a 2,700-kilometer-long Royal Road from his capital Susa to Sardis 
on the Aegean Sea and posted fresh horses every few dozen kilometers for his 
couriers; as the Greek historian Herodotus noted,  
there is nothing in the world that travels faster than these Persian couriers. . . . 
Neither snow, nor rain, nor heat, nor darkness of night prevents these couriers 
from completing their designated stages with utmost speed.  
The Romans also understood the need for efficient communications. Using 
their superb network of roads and relay stations, couriers of the cursus publicus 
carried government messages and important officials traveled at government 
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expense. Likewise the Incas built a network of 40,000 kilometers of graded 
footpaths along which runners carried messages throughout the empire. Similar 
courier networks existed in China and in the Mongol empire as well.  
In modern times, such networks have been essential elements in the forma-
tion of a global economy. The most complete of all networks was the one that 
the British built in the nineteenth century to communicate with and control 
their far-flung colonial empire. Yet this network was the means of challenging 
and undermining the very empire that created it.1 This is the story of that net-
work and how it contributed to the downfall of British rule in India. 
India was by far the most important colony of Great Britain, arguably more 
important than all the other colonies of all the European powers put together. 
By the mid-nineteenth century, the East India Company ruled the Indian sub-
continent much as the Mughals had done before it, namely by occupying a few 
strategic cities and siphoning off the wealth of the countryside through taxa-
tion, while leaving the underlying social structures and customs untouched. 
This laissez-faire approach changed suddenly with the appointment of a new 
governor-general, the Marquess of Dalhousie, who ruled India from 1848 to 
1856. Dalhousie was a radical modernizer, impatient to bring India into the 
modern world. In 1852, he wrote to the Court of Directors of the East India 
Company in London: 
Everything, all the world over, moves faster now-a-days than it used to do, 
except the transactions of Indian business. What with the number of function-
aries, boards, references, correspondences, and several Governments in India, 
what with the distance, the reference for further information made from Eng-
land, the fresh correspondences made from that reference, and the consultation 
of the several authorities in England, the progress of any great public measure, 
even when all are equally disposed to promote it, is often discouragingly 
slow.2 
One of Dalhousie’s initiatives was the Post Office Act of 1854, designed to 
replace the hodge-podge of local and provincial postal services with a single 
unified postal service for all of British India. At first, letters were carried by 
runners, but as the amount of mail grew, the runners were supplemented with 
mail carts and boats. The number of post offices grew rapidly, from 700 in 
1854 to 12,970 in 1900. By then every small town had a post office, from 
which runners carried the mail to outlying villages. Dalhousie’s reforms 
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brought postal service within the means of millions of Indians for the first 
time.3 As the Indian economist Mahindra Nath Das observed:  
The post office penetrated into innumerable villages of India. . . . The post of-
fice also played an important role in breaking down the static nature of Indian 
society. . . . Judged from whatever angle, social, cultural, educative or eco-
nomic, the half-anna postal system of Lord Dalhousie played a remarkable 
role in the progress of India.4 
Dalhousie was also responsible for introducing the telegraph to India. To 
construct a network, he turned to William O’Shaughnessy, an army surgeon 
who had experimented with telegraph wires twenty years earlier. Dalhousie 
sent O’Shaughnessy to England to obtain the approval of the East India Com-
pany and to purchase enough wire and equipment to build a 10,000-kilometer-
long network. The construction of the trunk lines connecting the major cities 
began in 1853. One year later, Dalhousie wrote to a friend about telegraph 
service between Calcutta and Bombay. “In less than one day the Government 
made communications which, before the telegraph was, would have taken a 
whole month – what a political reinforcement this is!”5  
In 1857 the uprising that the British called the “Sepoy Mutiny” and the Indi-
ans called the “Indian Rebellion” broke out in Hindustan. Though only the 
trunk lines were completed by then, the British found the telegraph indispensa-
ble in crushing the uprising. As the correspondent of The Times wrote during 
the Rebellion: “Never since its discovery has the electric telegraph played so 
important and daring a role as it does now in India; without it, the Commander-
in-Chief would lose the effect of half his force.”6 Or, as a British official ex-
claimed after the Rebellion: “The Electric Telegraph has saved India.”7 He 
meant for the British, of course.  
As soon as it had crushed the uprising, the government rushed to put up 
more telegraph lines. By 1865, the network was 28,000 kilometers long. In 
1900 the telegraph service had over 84,000 kilometers of land lines connecting 
4,949 telegraph offices in towns and cities, and carried several million tele-
grams a year, with runners to carry telegrams to and from small villages. By 
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independence in 1947, India had a 185,000 kilometers of telegraph lines. The 
rate was one rupee per sixteen-word message, much lower than in Europe or 
North America. Telegraphy was cheap enough for the Indian middle class as 
well as for the British, and contributed to the development of a large internal 
market. 
The most dramatic of Dalhousie’s modernization projects was the construc-
tion of railroads. Construction began in 1850 and the first locomotive pulled 
the first train in 1853. The Indian railways soon attracted more capital than any 
other form of enterprise in any European colony. As a result of this heavy 
investment, the Indian railway network surpassed that of Great Britain in length 
in 1895. Although British enterprises built the railroads for British purposes, 
such as transporting freight, soldiers, and officials, rail travel soon proved 
popular among ordinary Indians as well, even the poor. At the same time, they 
revolutionized the postal system in India. Mail that had been carried at 4 or 5 
kilometers per hour on the back of runners now traveled ten times as fast. Be-
ginning in 1864, the practice of sorting the mail in special railway cars speeded 
up the efficiency of the system yet more. By the end of the century, for exam-
ple, a letter from Bombay might reach Calcutta the next day, compared with 
two weeks or more in 1850. 
Communications between Britain and its colonies also accelerated sharply in 
the second half of the nineteenth century. Until the 1830s, mail between Britain 
and India traveled on the East India Company’s lumbering galleons that sailed 
around Africa and took from four to six months each way, with months in port 
at either end waiting for the right winds. Correspondents had to wait a year, and 
sometimes two years, to receive answers to their letters. Slightly faster trans-
port was possible via the so-called Overland Route through Mesopotamia and 
Syria, but at considerable risk from bandits and outbreaks of the plague.  
This situation changed in 1830, when the steamer Hugh Lindsay steamed 
from Bombay to Suez in thirty-one days; the letters it carried reached London 
twenty-eight days later, having crossed Egypt, the Mediterranean Sea, and 
Europe from the Adriatic to the English Channel. Soon there was monthly 
steamship service between Bombay and Suez, coordinated with Admiralty 
packet boats sailing between Alexandria and England. In 1837 a new shipping 
company, the Peninsular and Oriental Steam Navigation Company, or P&O, 
received a contract to transport the mail between England and Egypt. By 1858 
the P&O had fifty-five ships carrying mail and passengers between England 
and Alexandria and between Suez and India and beyond. The time needed to 
travel from England to India dropped to four to six weeks, and a correspondent 
could expect to get an answer to a letter in less than six months. The opening of 
the Suez Canal in 1869 and the development of faster steamships shortened the 
trip even more. By 1913 a sea voyage from England to Bombay took twenty-
one days by sea, or only thirteen days if one took the train to Brindisi at the 
southern tip of Italy and embarked on the steamer there. Although sailing ships 
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continued to play a role in coastal trade and in the Pacific Ocean, by the end of 
the nineteenth century they had been replaced by steamers on the heavily trav-
eled routes between Europe and India. 
By 1860 the British government was paying almost one million pounds ster-
ling a year – a fortune in those days – for mail contracts to various shipping 
lines. These subsidies ensured that the mails were handled safely and expedi-
tiously and carried on the fastest, safest, and most advanced ships available 
anywhere in the world. After the opening of the Suez Canal in 1869, postal 
communications with British colonies east of Suez became increasingly vital to 
the prosperity and security of the empire. 
Intercontinental telegraphy followed the same trajectory as shipping and 
domestic telegraph lines, but with a few years’ delay. Though France and Brit-
ain had been aware of the value of internal telegraphs since the French Revolu-
tion, overseas telegraphy had to await the development of submarine telegraph 
cables in the 1850s and ‘60s. During the Crimean War of 1854-55, a combina-
tion of land lines and short submarine cables allowed the French and British 
governments to interfere actively in the conduct of operations, while their re-
spective publics followed the news on a day-to-day basis thanks to telegraphic 
dispatches from war correspondents at the front.8  
As soon as that war ended, several British entrepreneurs proposed to lay 
telegraph lines to India. Before work could begin, the Indian Rebellion broke 
out in May 1857. News of that event did not reach London until forty days 
later. News stories published in the British press were all based on lurid reports 
by the English papers in India about the atrocities perpetrated by savage Indi-
ans.9 In a panic, the British government signed a fifty-year contract for a cable 
to be laid along the bottom of the Red Sea and the Indian Ocean between Suez 
and Bombay. But the technology was not yet mature, for the cable ships had 
laid the cable too taut along the rocky bottom of the Red Sea and it broke be-
fore it could transmit a single message. 
Though the first cable proved a disappointment, the demand remained as 
strong as ever. In 1865 a land line through the Ottoman Empire from Constan-
tinople to the Persian Gulf connected the European telegraph network with a 
cable to India. Telegrams crossed so many national borders and were relayed 
so many times, however, that the average message took six days, eight hours, 
and forty-four minutes to reach its destination. Another land line, this one 
across Prussia, Russia and Persia, provided an alternate route, but was even 
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slower, with an average delay of seventeen days, five hours, and five minutes.10 
Sending a telegram over these lines was extremely expensive, costing two 
pounds seventeen shillings for twenty words. Moreover, both lines were unreli-
able, for they were often interrupted by bad weather or broken by bandits, and 
their operators, few of whom knew English, frequently garbled the messages. 
The British government also worried about its important messages passing 
through so many foreign hands.  
In 1870, the Eastern Telegraph Company laid a cable from Suez to Bombay, 
thereby completing a connection between Britain and India that was entirely in 
British hands.11 Britain finally had fast – albeit very costly – communications 
with its principal colony. With the laying of a submarine cable all the way, the 
time it took a message to travel between London and Bombay dropped to six 
hours. By the end of the century, most telegrams made the trip in one to two 
hours. 
The British were justifiably proud, not only of their technical accomplish-
ments, but also of the political and cultural bonds that the new communications 
media forged. J. Henniker Heaton, an Australian who became a member of the 
British Parliament and an advocate for lower postage and telegraph rates, told 
the Royal Colonial Institute in 1887: 
Now it is often gloomily predicted by purblind students of history that this 
tremendous agglomeration [the British Empire] must inevitably break up and 
dissolve, like its predecessors. “Where,” they ask, “are the Greek, the Roman, 
the Spanish, the Napoleonic Empires? What is there in the British Empire to 
preserve it from the fate of these?” I venture to reply, that in the postal and te-
legraph services of the Empire our Queen possesses a cohesive force which 
was utterly lacking in former cases. Stronger than death-dealing warships, 
stronger than the might of devoted legions, stronger than wealth and genius of 
administration, stronger even than the unswerving justice of Queen Victoria’s 
rule, are the scraps of paper that are borne in myriads over the seas, and the 
two or three slender wires that connect the scattered parts of her realm.12 
Beneath this rosy picture, however, lurked problems that Mr. Heaton had 
not foreseen. One was the cost of operating mail steamers and telegraph cables, 
a cost that was far greater than even the British government could afford. 
Hence there was never a possibility of restricting these new communications 
media to government messages, as had been the case with the Royal Road of 
Persia or the Roman cursus publicus. To defray their staggering cost, the Brit-
ish telegraphic and postal networks were opened to the public from the start. 
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But so high were the rates that only the wealthiest individuals could afford to 
send telegrams to India, Australia, and other distant places.  
Besides governments, the cable companies relied on three kinds of custom-
ers: shipping companies, traders, and news agencies. To the shipping and trad-
ing companies, telegraphy was indispensable. Even sailing ships’ captains 
reported to their home offices whenever they reached a port.13 As for steam-
ships, they were so expensive that they had to be used almost continually to 
their maximum capacity. To make the most efficient use of steamers, mer-
chants needed up-to-date information about prices, supplies, markets, and other 
factors that could influence their business. News agencies arose to provide this 
information, as well as to supply news from foreign countries to newspapers.  
Among news agencies, Reuters was the first and most important.14 In 1850, 
soon after the first Prussian telegraph line was opened, Julius Reuter set up 
shop in Aachen in western Germany to communicate with Bernhard Wolff in 
Berlin, at the other end of the line. In 1851, when the first submarine telegraph 
cable was laid across the English Channel, Reuter moved to London and 
opened an office there and another one in Paris. In 1866, as soon as regular 
telegraphic communications with India was established, Reuter opened an 
office in Bombay; two years later, his company opened offices in Calcutta, 
Karachi, and Madras, as well as in Ceylon, Singapore, Hong Kong, Java, and 
Australia.  
By the early twentieth century, Reuters controlled the news of the British 
Empire and most of Asia, leaving the rest of the world to the French company 
Agence Havas, the German agency Wolff, and the American Associated Press. 
Of all of Reuters’ markets, India was the most profitable, employing up to one 
out of four of its correspondents. Thanks to its close ties with the British and 
Indian governments, Reuters handled almost all the news between India and the 
rest of the world. It received a special subsidy to supply the India Office in 
London with news and to diffuse India Office press releases. After buying up 
the two independent Indian news agencies, the Associated Press of India and 
the Indian News Agency, it also dominated the internal Indian news market. 
Reuters and its affiliates tied the empire together, but its web was entirely ra-
dial, with London at its center and very little direct communication among the 
other parts of the empire. 
In the laissez-faire atmosphere of nineteenth century Britain, there was little 
question of manipulating the news. Not only was this contrary to the liberal 
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tradition of British government, but it was reinforced by the assumption that all 
British actions were benevolent, so there was no reason to censor the news. In 
British eyes, everyone in the Empire, if not the entire world, would benefit 
from knowing the truth as presented by the British media. Nonetheless, the 
government of India, nervous about the attitude of Indians after the Rebellion 
of 1857, passed the “Vernacular Press Act” of 1878 that allowed it to censor 
Indian-language papers and to close offending ones and seize their machines 
and paper. But as this law did not apply to English-language papers, some 
Indian papers escaped the censor by switching to English.15 
The British government’s attitude toward the press began to change at the 
end of the century. In the South African or Boer War of 1899 to 1902, Britain 
censored communications not only between south Africa and Europe, but also 
between other European nations and their African colonies south of the Equa-
tor. Such censorship was justified by military necessity in time of war and was 
quickly lifted at the end of the hostilities, but it had demonstrated without a 
doubt the power of communication control in wartime. 
If information was a weapon of war that gave the advantage to Britain, it 
also had a corrosive effect on Britain’s hold on its empire. This was the unex-
pected consequence of modern communications. The Indian Rebellion of 1857-
58 had failed largely because it was localized in Hindustan and did not spread 
to Bengal or to southern or western India. Until the end of the century the very 
idea of India was a British concept. Most of the people of the sub-continent 
identified themselves not as Indians, but by their caste, their religion, their 
language, and the region they lived in. In Europe, nationalist campaigns 
aroused the interest of intellectuals in the folklore of common people; thus in 
Germany, Johann Gottfried von Herder and the brothers Jakob and Wilhelm 
Grimm collected folk tales, ballads, myths, and nursery rhymes as a means of 
asserting German national identity against the French. In India, however, the 
revival of interest in folklore emphasized not only pre-colonial culture, but also 
Tamil and Dravidian cultures against the dominance of upper-caste Hindu and 
Sanskrit culture.16 
Only in the eighteen-eighties and nineties did the belief that the various 
peoples of India had a common identity and destiny begin to penetrate the class 
of educated English-speaking Indians who served the Raj in clerical and minor 
administrative posts. Among them were the founders of the Indian National 
Congress who expected, in exchange for loyally serving the Raj, to be treated 
with respect and allowed to rise to higher positions in the bureaucracy. Several 
prominent Indians such as Dadabhoi Naoroji and Gopal Krishna Gokhale at-
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tended conferences of the Socialist International in Europe.17 What made them 
conscious of their common Indian-ness was their shared ability to speak Eng-
lish and their common experiences of racial discrimination. But so was their 
ability to communicate throughout the sub-continent by mail, telegraphs, and 
railroads. In the formation of Indian consciousness, the means of communica-
tion proved as important as the motivations. 
1904 and 1905 were key years in the history of the Indian independence 
movement. In January 1904, Viceroy Lord Curzon announced that he planned 
to divide Bengal, the largest and richest Indian province, into two smaller prov-
inces for administrative convenience. This plan aroused intense opposition in 
Bengal, not only among educated English-speaking Indians and the mercantile 
middle class, but also among peasants and workers. In protest against the parti-
tion, a movement called Swadeshi or “our land” arose in Calcutta to call for a 
boycott of British goods. Led by a newspaper campaign, especially in The 
Bengalee, a newspaper owned by the nationalist Surendranath Banerjee, the 
movement swept through Bengal. The Indian government, meanwhile, had 
lowered the rates of press telegrams and the cost of registering newspapers, 
contributing thereby to the diffusion of news throughout the sub-continent.18 As 
news of the protests and boycott was distributed by mail and telegraph, the 
movement quickly spread to other parts of India. 
In the midst of this growing turmoil came news that a Japanese army had 
defeated a Russian army at Mukden in Manchuria on March 10, 1905 and that 
the Japanese navy had sunk the Russian fleet at the battle of Tsushima Strait on 
May 27 and 28. The British government was pleased by these events, for it had 
long considered Russia a dangerous rival in Central Asia and a potential threat 
to India and had recently signed a treaty of alliance with Japan. The British 
prime minister, Arthur Balfour, told the House of Commons: “I am not intend-
ing to lead the House to suppose that . . . a war with Russia . . . is either possi-
ble or probable.”19  
Educated Indians, however, did not interpret the Japanese victory as a bless-
ing for the British Empire, but as the victory of an Asian nation over a Euro-
pean one, the first such victory since the Mongols conquered Russia seven 
centuries before. Jawaharlal Nehru, then a boy of fourteen, recalled: “The next 
important event that I remember affecting me was the Russo-Japanese War. 
Japanese victories stirred up my enthusiasm, and I waited eagerly for the pa-
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pers for fresh news daily.”20 The nationalist press greeted these events with 
glee. On March 28, after the Japanese victory at Mukden, The Daily Hitavadi 
of Calcutta wrote:  
With the victory of Japan, signs are visible of the awakening of a new life . . . 
looking forward to enjoying equal rights with the white subjects of Britain. 
The employment of Indians in increasing numbers in the higher offices of Sta-
tes; the meting out of equal justice between black and white . . . these are the 
points to which the aim of educated Indians is now-a-days prominently di-
rected.21 
And on June 14, 1905, Banerjea’s The Bengalee wrote: 
We feel that we are not the same people as we were before the Japanese suc-
cesses. . . . For the first time in modern history Asia has triumphed over Euro-
pe and has vindicated its equality in the knowledge of those arts which have 
their cradle in Europe and which have made Europe what she is.22 
The most militant nationalists found inspiration not in the victory of Japan 
over Russia, but in the Russian Revolution of 1905 and in the anarchist, nihil-
ist, and social revolutionary movements that convulsed the Russian Empire 
following its defeat. Some advocated making bombs and assassinating British 
officials and other terrorist acts. On August 12, 1907, the radical newspaper 
Yugantar (meaning New Era) wrote:  
There is another good means of acquiring strength of arms. Many people have 
observed in the Russian revolution that there are many partizans of the revolu-
tionaries among the Czar’s troops. These troops will join the revolutionists 
with various arms.23  
Gandhi himself is supposed to have called the Russian Revolution of 1905 
“the greatest event of the present century” and “a great lesson to us all.”24 
For several years after 1905, nationalist agitation and sporadic acts of vio-
lence continued to convulse India and arouse fear among the British. A strike 
by telegraph employees, quickly spread by telegraph throughout India and 
Burma in the spring of 1908, threatened the “nervous system” of the Indian 
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Empire. It only ended when the government granted concessions to its Euro-
pean and Eurasian signalers but dismissed many temporary and underpaid 
Indian peons and clerks, thereby hardening community identities.25 
In response to the unrest and the Swadeshi movement, the government of 
India passed the “Newspapers (incitement to offenses) Act” of 1908 and the 
“Indian Press Law” of 1910, making it illegal to print anything that was likely 
“to bring into hatred or contempt His Majesty or the Government. . . or to incite 
disaffection toward His Majesty or the said Government. . . .”26 A few British-
owned newspapers protested, but most ceased criticizing the government’s 
policies and became mouthpieces for the bureaucracy. Indian newspapers, 
however, were hard hit; by 1919, 350 presses and 300 newspapers were fined 
and 200 presses and 130 newspapers prevented from starting up.27 
But by then it was too late. There were many newspapers in India, both in 
English and in Indian languages, and even more numerous small printing 
presses, many of them not registered with the government. The Indian govern-
ment did not have the staff to read and censor them all. Besides, most of its 
employees were English-speaking Indians whose sympathies lay with the na-
tionalists. Increasing government censorship and the closing or fining of news-
papers only exacerbated the tensions between the British and their Indian na-
tionalist opponents and stimulated the rise of underground newspapers and 
pamphlets. 
During the First World War, Great Britain used every means possible to cut 
or intercept communications between the Central Powers and the rest of the 
world and tightly controlled the news in and out of India. In exchange for sup-
porting Britain in its struggle against Germany, many Indians expected that 
their loyalty and financial contributions to Britain would be rewarded with 
greater political autonomy and participation in government after the war. In-
stead, the British passed the Rowlatt Act of March 1918 making wartime cen-
sorship permanent and allowing the government to imprison without a trial 
anyone suspected of sedition or conspiracy. The act led to riots and strikes in 
several parts of India. In April 1919, when thousands demonstrated against the 
Rowland Act in the city of Amritsar, Brigadier General Reginald Dyer ordered 
his soldiers to fire on them. Hundreds of unarmed Indians were killed and 
several thousand others were wounded. News of this event flashed across India, 
inflaming relations even further. 
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By then, Mohandas K. Gandhi had emerged as the leader of the Indian Na-
tional Congress. Gandhi’s life is the subject of countless biographies and 
hagiographies; the library of the University of Chicago alone carries 868 books 
on Gandhi, and that is only a partial selection. Yet in this vast literature, Gan-
dhi’s non-violent philosophy and charismatic personality have completely 
overshadowed another side of the man, namely his extraordinary ability to 
organize a vast and often secret movement across a large nation under the 
noses of the British administration. To do so he relied on the very communica-
tions media that the British had blithely introduced to India less than a hundred 
years before. Whenever he was out of jail, he traveled widely on the railroads, 
making speeches to rapt audiences. Though he preached a return to a simpler 
life using village technologies, he was quite willing to use the telegraph and the 
telephone in the interests of his cause. He spread his ideas though the newspa-
pers he edited, including Harijan, Young India, and Navajivan. From these 
papers, his ideas were picked up by other newspapers.  
When Gandhi was in jail or on the road, the Central Directing Body of the 
Indian National Congress, led by that other great organizer Jawaharlal Nehru, 
stayed in touch with the regional offices of the independence movement by 
telegraph and letters. The Indian independence movement was not only a po-
litical tug-of-war between the British government and Indian nationalists, it 
was also a conflict over information. Indian nationalists made good use of the 
printing press, the telegraph, the postal system, and the railroads that the British 
had introduced. Meanwhile, saboteurs brought down telegraph lines, depriving 
the government of essential means of communication at strategic moments in 
the struggle.  
Gandhi was acutely conscious of the value of publicity, not only within In-
dia, but internationally as well. His way of life – his homespun garments, his 
vegetarianism, his sexual abstinence – were an integral part of his philosophy 
of non-violence, but they were also calculated to make him stand out among all 
the other political figures of his time. As a result he attracted a great deal of 
international attention. Reporters like Louis Fisher and photographers like 
Margaret Bourke-White and Henri Cartier-Bresson came to interview and 
photograph him for the Western press. In 1931, he was selected as “Man of the 
Year” by TIME magazine. When he was invited to London as representative of 
the Indian National Congress, the British left-wing press adulated him. 
During the Second World War, Gandhi demanded that the British leave In-
dia. In response to his Quit India movement, the government jailed many dissi-
dents and imposed strict censorship. Congress leaders retaliated by ordering the 
disruption of government communications, cutting telegraph wires and calling 
for railroad strikes. In the face of press and telegraph censorship, the party had 
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handbills, leaflets, and posters printed in secret and distributed by couriers.28 
Only harsh military rule allowed Great Britain to hold onto India for the dura-
tion of the war. 
I have used India as a case study, both because it was the most important of 
the European colonial possessions, and because it illustrates the unpredictable 
consequences of innovations in communication technologies. The moderniza-
tion program that Dalhousie had instituted in India was designed to make Brit-
ain’s presence on the sub-continent profitable and permanent. Instead, it un-
dermined British rule. Historians attribute the decolonization of India to a 
concept called nationalism and a change in the culture of India that united 
people from different regions and of different ethnicities and languages into 
one nationality. But what made nationalism possible in such a vast and cultur-
ally diverse land was the new communications media: the postal system, the 
railroads, the telegraph, the printing press, and the telephone. The increasing 
ability of Indians to acquire and disseminate ideas and information, using the 
very media of communication that the British had introduced, did not make 
British rule permanent, but undermined it instead. 
The events in the history of India that I have just described were but a pre-
cursor of the world we live in. We often characterize today’s world by high-
lighting the globalization of trade and culture. By globalization we mean that 
the economies of the world are becoming ever more interdependent and its 
cultures more homogeneous. As goods, money, and information flow around 
the world in ever-increasing quantities, wealthy nations and large corporations 
control an ever-larger share of the world economy and disseminate their cul-
tural products. So much of what we call globalization consists of such services 
as finance, entertainment, news and other information transmitted and diffused 
around the world, and trade consists increasingly of intangibles like software, 
films, music, and other forms of intellectual property. This whole process is 
based on astounding technological innovations: television with hundreds of 
channels, the Internet, mobile telephones, and multi-media devices of all sorts, 
all connected by satellites, fiber-optic cables, and digital wireless transmitters. 
Almost all of these technologies originated in Europe and America, and have 
contributed to the globalization of a world economy dominated by a few 
wealthy nations. 
Yet we can also describe the world by its increasing political fragmentation. 
Three major empires – the Russian, Austro-Hungarian, and Ottoman – fell 
apart after World War I. After World War II, the European colonial powers lost 
their colonies, as did the United States and Japan. The same British hegemony 
in global telecommunications that had contributed to its victory over Germany 
in two world wars helped undermine its empire. In turn, some of the former 
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colonies broke apart: Korea was divided in two and India split into India and 
Pakistan, then Bangla Desh broke away from Pakistan. A few years later, the 
Soviet Union disintegrated into sixteen pieces. Then came the turn of Czecho-
slovakia and Yugoslavia. From fifty members in 1945 the United Nations has 
grown to 192.  
Why these two conflicting trends, and what do they have in common? Both 
globalization and fragmentation are the result of the revolution in communica-
tions that was already apparent in Gandhi’s lifetime and has since become 
overwhelming. Without easy, fast, and inexpensive communications, the world 
economy as we know it would be inconceivable. At the same time, the new 
communications media carry ideas, among which is the powerful concept of 
nationalism. Nationalism has fragmented the political world. Nationalism may 
be a reaction to globalization, but it is also its offspring. As in the former Brit-
ish Empire, so also today the new communications media and the resulting 
flow of information are both the means of economic and cultural homogeniza-
tion, and the instruments of political fragmentation. 
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